Chris Lesniewski-Laas's research
I'm a graduate student in the Parallel and Distributed Operating Systems
group in the Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at
MIT. My advisor is Frans Kaashoek.
My goal is to develop secure and fully decentralized Internet systems which
can potentially scale to billions of participants. The challenge is
maintaining the integrity and reliability of the system without any
centralized authorities and despite concerted attacks by malicious
participants with arbitrary numbers of pseudonyms.
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A Sybil-proof one-hop DHT.
Chris Lesniewski-Laas.
To appear. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Social Network Systems, Glasgow, Scotland, April 2008.
Abstract PDF PS. -
Alpaca: extensible authorization for distributed services.
Chris Lesniewski-Laas, Bryan Ford, Jacob Strauss, Robert Morris, and M. Frans Kaashoek.
In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM, Alexandria, Virginia, October 2007.
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Persistent personal names for globally connected mobile devices.
Bryan Ford, Jacob Strauss, Chris Lesniewski-Laas, Sean Rhea, M. Frans Kaashoek, and Robert Morris.
In Proceedings of the Symposium on Operating System Design and Implementation, Seattle, Washington, November 2006.
Abstract HTML PDF PS. -
User-relative names for globally connected personal devices.
Bryan Ford, Jacob Strauss, Chris Lesniewski-Laas, Sean Rhea, M. Frans Kaashoek, and Robert Morris.
In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, Santa Barbara, California, February 2006.
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Sybil-resistant DHT routing.
George Danezis, Chris Lesniewski-Laas, M. Frans Kaashoek, and Ross Anderson.
In Proceedings of the European Symposium On Research In Computer Security, Milan, Italy, September 2005.
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SSL splitting: securely serving data from untrusted caches.
Chris Lesniewski-Laas and M. Frans Kaashoek.
In Computer Networks, 48(5):763–779, Elsevier, August 2005.
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SSL splitting: securely serving data from untrusted caches.
Chris Lesniewski-Laas and M. Frans Kaashoek.
In Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium, pages 187-199, Washington, D.C. August 2003.
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SSL splitting and Barnraising: cooperative caching with authenticity guarantees.
Chris Lesniewski-Laas.
Master’s Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February 2003.
Abstract PDF PS.
